Tracing the development of the
idea of identity from the time of Plato, the author Francis Fukuyama gives a
simple message of shaping a universal understanding of human dignity. Unless humans
do that conflict seems unavoidable. The author says that the inner self is the
basis of human dignity. He adds that economic grievances become more severe
when indignity and disrespect are attached with it.
The concept of identity is rooted in Thymos,
according to the author. This emerged only in modern times when it was combined
with a notion of an inner and an outer self, and the radical view that the
inner self was more valuable than the outer one. This was the product of both a
shift in ideas about the self and the realities of societies that started to
evolve rapidly under the pressures of economic and technological change.
Modern concept of identity
unites three different phenomena. The first is thymos which craves for
recognition. The second is the distinction between the inner and the outer self
and the raising of the moral valuation of the inner self over outer society.
The third is an evolving concept of dignity, in which recognition is due not
just to a narrow class of people, but to everyone.
In chapter five titled Revolutions
of Dignity, the author states that ‘desire for the state to recognize one’s
basic dignity has been at the core of democratic movements since the French Revolution’.
The author extensively refers to the western thinkers including Rousseau, Kant,
Hegel, Marx and many others. Fukuyama says that nationalism and Islamism can be
seen as a species of identity politics. Both provide an ideology that explains
why people feel lonely and confused. And both of them demand recognition in
restrictive ways (only for the members of a particular national or religious
group).
In chapter nine the author describes
thymos, isothymia and megalothymia. Thymos is part of the soul that desires for
recognition, isothymia which is recognition as equal in dignity to others and
megalothymia which is recognition as superior. In the same chapter there is criticism
of the left. The argument is that the left is not building solidarity around
large collectivities such as the working class, instead it chooses to focus on
smaller groups being marginalized in specific ways.
Understandings of dignity
forked in two directions during the nineteenth century. One, toward a liberal individualism
and second toward collective identities for e.g. nation or religion. Fukuyama
says that in liberal democracies identity politics began to reconverge with the
collective and illiberal forms of identity such as nation and religion.
Fukuyama suggests that ‘a
shift in the agendas of both left and right toward the protection of ever
narrower group identities threatens the possibility of communication and
collective action’. In addition to that
he suggests that the remedy is to define larger and more integrative national
identities that take account of the de facto diversity of existing democracies.
Inclusive national identities are
encouraged by the author. Policy of assimilation is to be promoted as liberal democracies
benefit greatly from immigration, both economically and culturally, writes the
author. Identify politics is making things harder and complicated. Fukuyama
says that: “Social media and the internet have facilitated the emergence of
self-contained communities, walled off not by physical barriers but by belief
in shared identity”. The last chapter stresses that the human race will not
escape thinking about themselves in terms of identity. In fact, identity should
be used to integrate and if this happen populist politics would be remedied.
