This book is based on seven chapters. Chapter one covers the French threat, second chapters reflect on the controversy surrounding Cutch (Kutch), third describes the expansion of the British in the region. Chapter four focuses on the Afghan crises from 1834 to 1838. The next chapter gives details about Ellenborough, Napier and the Amirs of Sind. Chapter six is about the annexation of Sind and the repercussions of annexation. Chapter seven is the final chapter which states the conclusion of the book.
The East India company maintained factories in Sindh from 1635 to 1662 and from 1758 to 1775. In the 16th century the Balochs moved to Sindh from the West hills of Sind to become the governing class of the province. In the last years of the eighteenth century the British were well aware of the extension of the French hegemony across Europe. The British became alarmed. As a defense the British wanted to take control of Sindh as it was a logical invasion route (p. 1). Cutch became a British dependency after the treaties of 1816 and 1819. British activity in Sind after the treaty of 1834 was directed toward attainment of three objectives: the conducting of a full survey of the Indus, the encouragement of increased commerce on the river, and the establishment of a residency in Sind. These goals were all achieved within the next four years with the indirect aid of Ranjit Sind (p. 29).
Ranjit Singh could only expand in the direction of Sind, and his efficient army commanded by French officers remained an implicit threat to British influence in the area (p. 31). In 1818 he captured Multan and in 1823. In 1835 Ranjit Singh moved against the Mazari tribe of Rojhan (headed by their chief Behram Khan).
Huttenback states that British contacts with Sind were initially limited to trading establishments and then to treaties which had as their role purpose the protection of India from invasion first by France and later by Russia through the Indus valley. When these fears waned British interest in Sindh faded. By 1830 British interest in Sindh increased. They wanted commerce. As per the author the British did not want trade with Sind, in fact they wanted trade with the interior of Asia where the Russian was already present. Sind was assumed to be a buffer against Russia and a major line of communication.
The treaties of 1832, 1834, and 1838-1839 changed the amirs from the rulers of an independent nation to princes of a client state (p. 110). The attitude of the British officers varied from individual to individual, but it was evident to some degree in virtually every officer who acted on behalf of the company on the subcontinent.
Huttenback’s study provides an insight to the complexities of nineteenth-century British imperialism when the British empire was still expanding.
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