The central theme of this book is the post September 11, 2001 foreign policy of the United States of America. Francis Fukuyama has come to the conclusion that he can no longer support neoconservatism (both as a political symbol and body of thought) as it has developed into something which has become irreversibly identified with the policies of the first term of George W. Bush's administration. Fukuyama stresses on the need to redefine American foreign policy in a way that it moves beyond the Bush administration's legacy and that of its neoconservative supporters.Certain interpretations of neoconservatism helped America during the Cold War, but during the 1990s the principles were used to justify a foreign policy that led to the war in Iraq. Fukuyama says that the neoconservative legacy is complex and diverse, tracing its back to the early 1940s. One feature of neoconservative writing during the 1990s was its general lack of interest in international economics or development (p. 43). They were by and large concerned with politics, security, and ideology; they generated relatively few distinctive opinions about globalization, competitiveness, development, and other issues (p. 44).
Four basic thought that logically explain the policy positions are based on the following principles:
1). A belief that the internal character of regimes matter ad that foreign policy must reflect the deepest values of liberal democratic societies.
2). A belief that American power has been and could be used for moral purposes, and that the United States needs to remain engaged in international affairs.
3). A distrust of social engineering projects.
4). And finally, skepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law and institutions to achieve either security or justice.
Fukuyama believes that jihadism is a by-product of modernization and globalization, not traditionalism (p. 74). the author says that all foreign policies, including doing nothing and maintaining the status quo, involve risks (p. 92). The Bush administration and its neoconservative supporters failed to anticipate the hostility of the global reaction to the war before undertaking it, particularly in Europe.
American policy approaches to development were heavily driven by the needs of American foreign policy, since the United States at that time saw itself locked in a deadly competition with the communist world for influence over developing countries. Institutions are one of the many dimensions of development; resources in the form of investment capital, good economic policies, geography, disease burdens, and the like all contribute to development outcomes (p. 123).
The author says that establishing or reforming institutions is almost always more of a political than a technocratic problem (p. 124). The United States and the international community together have developed an impressive range of political tools for supporting democratic regime change since the early 1980s (p. 131). Fukuyama stresses on the need of multiplicity of international organizations that could provide both power and legitimacy for different types of challenges to world order (p. 162).
Fukuyama believes that what is required is 'realistic Wilsonianism that recognizes the importance to world order of what goes on inside states and that better matches the available tools to the achievement of democratic ends' (p. 184). Furthermore, Fukuyama is of the view that the United States should promote both political and economic development and it should care about what happens inside states around the world. The primary focus should be on 'good governance, political accountability, democracy and strong institutions.'
The author of the book emphasizes on the importance of tacking development and creating overlapping international institutions, and would also avoid 'preventive war'. He presents this as a new approach.
